Her claim is similar but not the same. She insists that "ινα" signals a representation of the thought, desire, intention of the speaker, whereas I don't think "ινα" necessarily has to do with the speaker's mental state. In many cases it will actually be true that the contents of the "ινα" clause will be part of what the speaker is thinking about, but that in no way means that "ινα" functions to signal that! Her claim that "ινα" signals a "desirable outcome" is perfectly in line with what I call a "purposed result". I think you were confused because you did not know the meaning of the English word "purpose" when used as a verb. The examples you quote from her are indeed convincing of this aspect, but not at all of her claim regarding "representation of mental state", nor of her later opinion-based claims. Anyway all this doesn't have much to do with your original question, and if you answer my four questions you will see the reason for my answer to that. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 27th, 2014, 8:47 ammoon wrote: David said: I said that "ινα" heads a clause that denotes a purposed result. Also, I didn't say that it must describe the purpose for the preceding phrase. Now I can understand what David has been saying about ινα: I think that his view can be the same as that of Sim. The difference may be one of terminology. Let me quote from Sim: [...]
Smyth does consider "ινα" as subordinating, but as I quoted he says "The principal clause is sometimes omitted.", in other words he allows for "ινα" to head an apparently independent clause, and does not insist that it must explain the purpose for some other clause, unlike what Margaret Sim sets up as a straw man in the first few pages. In addition, he does say "Object clauses after verbs of effort are introduced by ὅπως, rarely by ὡς (Herodotus, Xenophon), scarcely ever by ἵνα.". LSJ makes it quite clear that it considers many of those disputed instances as elliptical. Does labeling "ινα" as a "final conjunction" make both Smyth and LSJ automatically wrong? As for my analysis of "ινα", I consider the "ινα" clause to function as either a conjunction joining two clauses (the first of which may sometimes be omitted), or as a noun phrase by itself. As I said in my post, it is clear from Eph 5:27 and 2 Thes 3:9 that ellipsis is indeed the best explanation in some cases, and so I disagree with Margaret Sim throwing it out in many of her examples. I don't expect Margaret Sim to disprove my claims, but was just stating as a matter of fact that none of her examples (in the first 100 pages) cannot be easily explained by taking "ινα" as denoting a purposed result. And I did not miss her point. At the start I distinguished between her objection to what she perceived as the traditional view of "ινα" and her further claims about its meaning that go beyond that. Right at the end I also said:Stephen Carlson wrote:No, both Smyth and LSJ label ἵνα as a final (subordinating) conjunction. The whole point of such a conjunction is to relate two clauses. The fact that you can find a purpose outside of the linked clause (e.g. as in 1 John 1:9) actually demonstrates that ἵνα is not functioning as a final conjunction per Smyth and LSJ. In fact, that is the problem she is trying to solve. You answer appears to me (it is rather vague) that ἵνα is not a conjunction at all but some kind of an adverb of purpose or something like that. I'm not sure I agree because it gets the part of speech wrong. Clearly, Sim cannot be expected to disprove a view unless it had been present in the scholarly literature. The rest of your critique appears to be the result of missing her point.David Lim wrote:Firstly, it doesn't disprove what I said. Specifically, I said that "ινα" heads a clause that denotes a purposed result. Also, I didn't say that it must describe the purpose for the preceding phrase. I've always understood Smyth and LSJ to be referring to the broader notion of a purposed result rather than that "ινα" must link two clauses with one being the purpose for the other.
And if really all that I said stem from missing her point, then are you asserting that you agree with the claims of hers regarding difference in choice meaning difference in meaning, Judas' betrayal, and events happening in order to fulfill the writings? I fail to see how all those claims aren't theologically driven. As I said before, if we want to discuss the language as a language, we cannot accommodate theology, but should rely on statistically observed data. Otherwise the issue becomes a matter of opinion and completely unfalsifiable. So I hope that you understand my objections even if you disagree with my stand. Or you can blame me for liking only scientific approaches.She is right that "ινα" is not the same as "in order that", but her further claims about its meaning are not supported by proper evidence.
Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 27th, 2014, 8:18 am
David said: I said that "ινα" heads a clause that denotes a purposed result. Also, I didn't say that it must describe the purpose for the preceding phrase. Now I can understand what David has been saying about ινα: I think that his view can be the same as that of Sim. The difference may be one of terminology. Let me quote from Sim: (1) I claim that ινα does not have a fixed meaning of ‘in order that’, but rather that its function is to alert the reader to expect a thought, desire or intention of the speaker, and the fact that the verb of that clause is in the subjunctive mood signals that this represents a potential rather than actual state of affairs. (p.4) (2) Although a notion of ‘purpose’ may be said to lie behind the giving of a command or prayer, this might be better analysed as a ‘desirable outcome’ , since there is no action from which "purpose" could be derived. The subject is rather expressing his will in an utterance which indicates a potential, rather than actual, state of affairs. An RT analysis which presents ινα as introducing a desirable state of affairs, from the perspective of the subject, is a more satisfactory interpretation of such clauses. (p.21) (3) The diffference between the two particles ινα and οτι: the former introduces a thought about a state of affairs which is potential and may not in fact be realised, while the latter introduces a clause which claims to be a representation of an actual situation, a real ‘state of affairs’. (p.22) === The difference between David and Sim is: "purposed result" versus "desirable outcome" ( = thought, desire or intention of the speaker). Sim: Since there is no action from which ‘purpose’ could be derived, the notion of purpose cannot be the constraint of ινα. David: No problem. I did not say that the purpose should be that of the preceding phrase. Sim and David use the term "purpose" differently. I think David' usage would tend to confuse people. At least I was confused. David, is there any reason why you would prefer "purposed result" to "desirable outcome"? ······· Sim's example in p. 142 seems quite convincing: Example (10) εντολην καινην διδωμι υμιν, ἱνα αγατᾶτε αλληλουσ. I am giving you a new commandment that you love one another. Here the ἱνα clause gives not only the content of the ‘new commandment’, but also the desirable state of affairs which the speaker wishes to see: you should love one another. Also, her example in p. 149 - 152 is also convincing. Ex (17): εκηρυσσεν τον Ιησοῦν ὁτι οὗτος εστιν ὁ υἱοσς τοῦ θεοῦ. He was proclaiming that Jesus is the son of God. Ex (18): Και εξελθοντες εκηρυξαν ἱνα μετανοῶσιν. Going out, they preached that people should repent. Sim said (p. 152): Their preaching is mentioned in the context of other activities, such as casting out demons and healing the sick. Given that context, the ἱνα clause more naturally describes what was preached, rather than why. Moon Jung. Statistics: Posted by moon — June 27th, 2014, 2:21 am
Well, thanks.David Lim wrote:Since you ask about this study, here is my opinion.Stephen Carlson wrote:In this connection, I would welcome thoughts on Margaret Sim's study of ἵνα n a 2006 U. Edinburgh thesis called A Relevance Theoretic approach to the particle 'hina' in Koine Greek.
No, both Smyth and LSJ label ἵνα as a final (subordinating) conjunction. The whole point of such a conjunction is to relate two clauses. The fact that you can find a purpose outside of the linked clause (e.g. as in 1 John 1:9) actually demonstrates that ἵνα is not functioning as a final conjunction per Smyth and LSJ. In fact, that is the problem she is trying to solve. You answer appears to me (it is rather vague) that ἵνα is not a conjunction at all but some kind of an adverb of purpose or something like that. I'm not sure I agree because it gets the part of speech wrong. Clearly, Sim cannot be expected to disprove a view unless it had been present in the scholarly literature. The rest of your critique appears to be the result of missing her point. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 26th, 2014, 12:31 pmDavid Lim wrote: Firstly, it doesn't disprove what I said. Specifically, I said that "ινα" heads a clause that denotes a purposed result. Also, I didn't say that it must describe the purpose for the preceding phrase. I've always understood Smyth and LSJ to be referring to the broader notion of a purposed result rather than that "ινα" must link two clauses with one being the purpose for the other.
Since you ask about this study, here is my opinion.Stephen Carlson wrote: In this connection, I would welcome thoughts on Margaret Sim's study of ἵνα n a 2006 U. Edinburgh thesis called A Relevance Theoretic approach to the particle 'hina' in Koine Greek.
Firstly, it doesn't disprove what I said. Specifically, I said that "ινα" heads a clause that denotes a purposed result. Also, I didn't say that it must describe the purpose for the preceding phrase. I've always understood Smyth and LSJ to be referring to the broader notion of a purposed result rather than that "ινα" must link two clauses with one being the purpose for the other. Secondly, I disagree with the author's claims about the meaning of "ινα" in many cases. Let's look at some of the examples in the thesis, where the author claims cannot really be understood as a normal "ινα" clause and gives her alternative explanation.
[1 John 1:9] εαν ομολογωμεν τας αμαρτιας ημων πιστος εστιν και δικαιος ινα αφη ημιν τας αμαρτιας και καθαριση ημας απο πασης αδικιας
But "ινα αφη ημιν τας αμαρτιας ..." describes the result that God purposes for us, so I consider it indeed a normal "ινα" clause. [Luke 18:41] λεγων τι σοι θελεις ποιησω ο δε ειπεν κυριε ινα αναβλεψω "ινα αναβλεψω" is again a normal "ινα" clause because it describes the result that the blind man wanted Jesus to make happen. It is thus distinct from using an imperative or subjunctive, and yet doesn't at all necessitate interpreting it as explicitly conveying the thought or wish of the blind man. [1 Cor 9:18] τις ουν μοι εστιν ο μισθος ινα ευαγγελιζομενος αδαπανον θησω το ευαγγελιον του χριστου εις το μη καταχρησασθαι τη εξουσια μου εν τω ευαγγελιω "ινα ... αδαπανον θησω ..." describes what Paul purposes to be (has in mind as) his reward for announcing the glad tidings. [Luke 14:28-29] τις γαρ εξ υμων ο θελων πυργον οικοδομησαι ουχι πρωτον καθισας ψηφιζει την δαπανην ει εχει τα εις απαρτισμον ινα μηποτε θεντος αυτου θεμελιον και μη ισχυοντος εκτελεσαι παντες οι θεωρουντες αρξωνται εμπαιζειν αυτω "ινα μηποτε ..." describes a result that one would not intend. [John 1:22] ειπον ουν αυτω τις ει ινα αποκρισιν δωμεν τοις πεμψασιν ημας τι λεγεις περι σεαυτουMargaret Sim wrote: The content of the clause introduced by ἵνα ‘that he should forgive our sins…’ cannot be the purpose of the righteous and faithful nature of God. It is rather the reverse: the author is claiming that the faithfulness and righteous nature of God is the basis on which such forgiveness might be predicated.
If an agenda is not a purpose, I don't know what it is. Furthermore this illustrates my point earlier that if we drop "ινα", we would need some other words like "δει" to convey the connotation of purpose. In English we can't just start an independent clause with "that", so we either have to use ellipsis as in "tell us, so that ..." or we similarly have to use other words as in "we { must / need to } give an answer ...". I don't see ellipsis in an English translation as being "driven by the desire to keep the telic force for the particle, and so maintain it as a subordinating conjunction following a main verb.", contrary to the author's assertion. Just look at the following: [Eph 5:27] ινα παραστηση αυτην εαυτω ενδοξον την εκκλησιαν μη εχουσαν σπιλον η ρυτιδα η τι των τοιουτων αλλ ινα η αγια και αμωμος [2 Thes 3:9] ουχ οτι ουκ εχομεν εξουσιαν αλλ ινα εαυτους τυπον δωμεν υμιν εις το μιμεισθαι ημας In these instances the "ινα" clause is clearly a purpose-describing clause because it is parallel to another purpose-describing clause, and clearly requires ellipsis because the other clause does not have the same grammatical function. So if these have ellipsis, I don't see why those in John must not. The writer just seems to like "αλλ ινα". [Acts 24:4] ινα δε μη επι πλειον σε εγκοπτω παρακαλω ακουσαι σε ημων συντομως τη ση επιεικεια Again, this independent "ινα μη" clause simply describes a certain result that is not wanted, namely that Felix wastes his time. [Dem 21:43] πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν οἱ περὶ τῆς βλάβης οὗτοι νόμοι πάντες, ἵν᾽ ἐκ τούτων ἄρξωμαι, ἂν μὲν ἑκὼν βλάψῃ, διπλοῦν, ἂν δ᾽ ἄκων, ἁπλοῦν τὸ βλάβος κελεύουσιν ἐκτίνειν ... "ἵν᾽ ἐκ τούτων ἄρξωμαι" is isolated, but it is not totally devoid of the connotation of purpose as the author claims. It means something like "let me begin from these [things]", but unlike this English approximation the Greek "ινα" conveys not an imperative but the purposed result, something more like "[allow me] so that I might begin from these [things]". That is why LSJ says "where the purpose of the utterance is stated", and Smyth says "the principle clause is omitted". [Dionysius 4:80:1] [...] αὐτίκα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ἵν᾽ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἄρξωμαι, πῶς παρέλαβεν; ἆρά γ᾽ ὡς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι βασιλεῖς; πόθεν; Similarly here "ιν απο ταυτης αρξωμαι" means something like "[allow me] so that I might begin from this". Anyway this kind of construction may be somewhat of an idiom and the audience may not consciously process it as a purposed result, just as we won't normally consciously process "let me begin here" as an imperative when it occurs in everyday usage. [2 Mac 1:9] και νυν ινα αγητε τας ημερας της σκηνοπηγιας του χασελευ μηνος ετους εκατοστου ογδοηκοστου και ογδοου Here "ινα αγητε ..." is clearly an injunction "[see] that you hold/celebrate the days of the feast of tabernacles ...", which naturally follow the usage of "ινα" with certain verbs of speech to convey instructions. [BGU IV.1079] [...] μη ινα αναστατωσης ημας Here, all "ινα" does is to convey the desired result, and the context suggests that it is part of a request. Likewise for the other similar quotes it is the context that determines the tone. [Eph 5:33] πλην και υμεις οι καθ ενα εκαστος την εαυτου γυναικα ουτως αγαπατω ως εαυτον η δε γυνη ινα φοβηται τον ανδρα "η γυνη ινα φοβηται τον ανδρα" conveys what is desired, so since it is in parallel with "υμεις οι καθ ενα εκαστος την εαυτου γυναικα ουτως αγαπατω ως εαυτον", we should take it to be a parallel injunction. Similarly the "ινα" in 1 Cor 7:29 by itself conveys neither a full imperative nor the purpose for the time to be shortened, but rather a desired situation. If the abstract wasn't enough to trigger a warning bell, consider this:Margaret Sim wrote: This is also denied and so the questioners are forced to reveal their real agenda: ‘We must give an answer to those who sent us.’
I maintain my stand that difference in choice of words does not necessarily mean a difference in intended meaning, and so if "biblical scholars" using "Relevance Theory" draw inferences based on a faulty assumption, their conclusions are bound to be biased so that they can fit them into their view. I don't wish to expand on this since I've given sufficient evidence of interchangeable constructions before, so it is up to those who claim a difference in intended meaning between two specific constructions to prove it. Soon after that we see another forced interpretive framework due to theological bias:Margaret Sim wrote: There is a general belief that writers use alternative but equivalent constructions as a matter of style. In RT, however, a writer in making a particular choice of words or grammatical constructions is inviting the reader to make inferences, and biblical scholars do just this. One example of this is the inference drawn from the Johannine use of σημεια rather than δυναμεις for ‘marvellous acts’ that this is a theological statement on the part of the author.
Needless to say, this conclusion is erroneous. Firstly, Luke 9:44 has Jesus saying "δει πληρωθηναι παντα τα γεγραμμενα εν τω νομω μωσεως και προφηταις και ψαλμοις περι εμου", which explicitly asserts that the things that had been written in the law of Moses and prophets and psalms about Jesus must be fulfilled. As written, this implies that those things written in the psalms were considered as actually being about Jesus, not just that they could be applied to Jesus. Secondly, Matt 26:54-56 is even more explicit in implying that the writings cannot be fulfilled unless events transpired exactly as recorded, contrary to Margaret Sim. To impose on the language due to personal opinion is not right, and incidentally will just encourage others to do just the same as they. I saw the next many pages stemming again from the same untenable assumptions (For example she says that Judas' betrayal is "a ‘fulfilment’ or an application of Psalm 41:9, but Judas did not act the way he did in order to fulfil it.") and so I stopped at the end of the chapter. I hope what I said is clear enough for others to come to their own carefully reasoned conclusions, since I don't wish to spend more time discussing someone's interpretive framework. She is right that "ινα" is not the same as "in order that", but her further claims about its meaning are not supported by proper evidence. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 26th, 2014, 11:19 amMargaret Sim wrote: The usual interpretation, and also the translation, of these verses is that the events(s) occurred in order that the scripture might be fulfilled. Looked at dispassionately, such an attribution of purpose might lead one to deduce that if the event had not occurred the Scripture could not have been fulfilled. In the case of quotations from the Psalms, the source text was not a prophecy, but a commentary on the psalmist’s situation or a cry to God for help. I claim that current events caused the observers to remember something that had been spoken of earlier. This seems to be a more logical way of viewing such an utterance, than seeing it as a claim of fulfilment. It is difficult to view an event as taking place solely to make something predicted earlier come true, while having no relevance during the lifetime of the original hearers of the prediction, particularly when the earlier writing was not in a prophetic book. Surely what we have here may be the author attributing to Jesus the realisation that in fact the event recalls words spoken earlier. The event does ‘fulfil’ the earlier words, but did not take place in order to fulfil it. I am not, therefore, disputing the element of fulfilment, but rather I view it as the application of a previous experience, in the case of the Psalms. I deny the attribution of purpose to the introductory particle.
Stephen, thanks for the dissertation of Sim. I will read it today. David, many thanks for pushing me. I will do the homeworks you assigned to me, and come back^^. By "experiment", I mean "guess wild and see if it can hold water". Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 25th, 2014, 9:47 pm
I must say, I wondered whether we'd get around to bringing Margaret Sim's work on ἵνα to bear on this question. I'm glad to see you've done it, Stephen. Statistics: Posted by cwconrad — June 25th, 2014, 2:02 pm
In this connection, I would welcome thoughts on Margaret Sim's study of ἵνα n a 2006 U. Edinburgh thesis called A Relevance Theoretic approach to the particle 'hina' in Koine Greek.
Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 25th, 2014, 10:06 amSim, abstract wrote: This thesis uses insights from a modern theory of communication, Relevance Theory, to examine the function of certain particles - in particular the conjunction ἵνα- in Koine Greek. This particle has been regarded from the time of Classical Greek as an introducer of purpose clauses and so has been thought to have the lexical meaning of ‘in order that.’ More recently, however, scholars have recognised that in the New Testament at least, no more than 60% of the uses of ἵνα merit such a translation, with a considerable number of independent clauses being introduced by this particle also. Apart from the New Testament it is the case that pagan writers of Koine used this particle to introduce a wider range of clauses than merely those with a telic relationship to the main clause of the sentence. This is particularly noticeable in the Discourses of Epictetus, a philosopher who taught in the latter half of the first century of the Christian era. In addition, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a notable critic of literary style and the historian Polybius, both writing within the Koine period used hina to introduce indirect commands and noun clauses as well as purpose clauses. The frequency of such uses (approximately 10% of all the instances of this particle) in their writings is considerably less than that of Epictetus, but those uses are nevertheless present in their works. Since ἵνα was used for this wider range of clauses by pagan, non-Jewish authors, some of whom spoke Greek as their first language, it seems extremely implausible to attribute such use to the incompetence of the implied authors of the New Testament, or ‘Semitic interference’. Since the many instances of non-telic hina in the New Testament are identified with reference to the context in which they occur, the telic instances should also be deduced from such context. I claim that the function of this particle is not to introduce a purpose clause nor does it have a fixed lexical meaning of ‘in order that’, but rather that it alerts the reader to expect an interpretation of the thought of the speaker or implied author. Of course in many instances a clause introduced by ἵνα will be a purpose clause, but this is inferred from context rather than solely from the presence of this particle. This thesis proposes a unified account of the function of hina which fits the developing pattern of the language and relates it to the particle ὅτι, and provides a theoretical basis for its use as an indicator of speaker or subject’s thought, thus enabling a reader to re-examine biblical texts whose interpretation has been problematic to date.
No it's not forced. I never make any presuppositions, but rather find the best explanation for the data.moon wrote: (1) About the examples I provided, you seem to say that the ἵνα clauses still have purposes in mind. But this judgement seems forced, which is caused by the presupposition that the ἵνα clauses ALWAYS introduce purposes.
The quote of Robertson that you gave is in perfect agreement with my understanding. An "ινα" clause in these cases we are considering indeed functions as a noun phrase, but it is quite easily seen that it is only used when the content is a purposed result. This is why the majority of content clauses use "οτι". To disprove my claim is rather easy; you just have to find some examples where the content is not a purposed result.moon wrote: (2) You said" If you compare these with Matt 12:16, 14:36, 28:10 it would become clearer that "ινα" and "οτι" are distinct. ==== Let me use Mat 28:10 for further discussion. ὑπάγετε ἀπαγγεἰλατε τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου ἵνα αʼπελθωσιν εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν. go tell my brothers that they should go to Galilee. [or go tell my bothers to go to Galilee]. Robertson, in his big grammar book, p. 991 says that in these examples, ἵνα + subjunctive verb (or sometimes future indicative verb) functions like "object or subject clauses like ὅτι clauses". After the verbs of saying, the ἵνα clause defines the content of the saying, although the content is not indicative. The ἵνα clause in this context is often interchangeable with the infinitive clause. So, ἵνα introduces a subjective/jussive clause, which states a purpose or a non-indicative content depending on the context. This is clearly seen in the following examples, where the ἵνα clause is used as a nominative case.
"ινα ποιω ..." is used because that is the purpose for his life, here symbolized by food, because just as food fills us physically, his purpose fills him.Jo 4:34. Ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θἐλͅμα τοῦ πέμψαντος με
"ινα ελθη ..." is used because she is asking for what reason Mary comes to her, in other words the purpose for the (observed) result. In all the above instances "οτι" is not suitable. I'll repeat what I said before: To rephrase using "οτι" would not only require switching from subjunctive to indicative, it would also need additional words like "δει" to convey a similar content of necessity, though it would still be slightly different from using "ινα".Lk 1:43 Καὶ πόθεν μοι τοῦτο ἵνα ἔλθῃ ἡ μητηρ τοῦ κυρίου μου πρός εʼμέ;
This is not English at all and makes no sense. I'll give you two choices: (1) What the law says to those in the law, the law speaks in order that every mouth might be stopped and all the world might come to be culpable to God. (2) What the law says to those in the law is the following: that every mouth is to be stopped and all the world is to be culpable to God. (1) is grammatically possible but not natural. (2) is impossible because it doesn't account for "λαλει". If you meant neither then I don't know what you meant. You should really use proper English to convey your thoughts rather than using weird renderings that puzzle us. If you want to continue, please precisely specify the following: (a) What is the case of "οσα" (b) What is the subject of "λαλει" (c) Give an example where "ινα" heads a clause that is unambiguously the content of speech. (d) Give an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object.moon wrote: (3)My translation implies "factual assertions". So, I should have written: What the law says to those in the law, it speaks that every mouth be stopped and all the world be guilty before God.
As we've already said earlier, this rendering puts the contents of what the law says as the subject of "speaks", which is completely wrong. If you insist on this translation, you will be in our opinion portraying not the original text but rather your opinion.moon wrote: If acceptable, I would prefer my original translation: What the law says to those in the law speaks that every mouth be stopped and all the world be guilty before God.
I don't care to discuss so-called "lexicons" that are full of doctrine, as no one can distinguish between fact and opinion without already knowing which is which.moon wrote: The use of λαλεω [speaks] seems significant If the explanation in Thayer's lexicon [...]
If you read the policy of , we do not discuss interpretation of the writings beyond the surface meaning, so we do not attempt to solve doctrinal puzzles, otherwise there will be no end. Also bear in mind that the meaning of words in isolation often have to be heavily modified by the context. For example "πας" may mean "every of some group" but that group is dependent on the context. I don't know what you mean by "experiment", but if you don't have statistical evidence to back up your claims I'm not going to be convinced. You can certainly wait and see what Stephen and the others have to say about it. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 25th, 2014, 9:54 ammoon wrote: (4) If that's the case, you should stick to a proper translation. Whether an impossible interpretation "fits" the context does not make it possible. Of course one could always say that no interpretation is impossible, but then deciding with certainty on the meaning of any sentence would be impossible, and discussion too becomes meaningless. ===== You are definitely right. But I felt very strongly that I needed to do some experiment here. If Paul says: we have already charged that all, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin, AS IT IS WRITTEN " X ", would expect that the content of X would indict both Jews and Greeks. But according to the usual translation, Paul writes that the indictment of the law applies only to those in the law, that is, the Jews. That puzzles me.
David, many thanks for pushing me to make sense of what I saying. Let me pursue a bit more. (1) About the examples I provided, you seem to say that the ἵνα clauses still have purposes in mind. But this judgement seems forced, which is caused by the presupposition that the ἵνα clauses ALWAYS introduce purposes. Please see below. (2) You said" If you compare these with Matt 12:16, 14:36, 28:10 it would become clearer that "ινα" and "οτι" are distinct. ==== Let me use Mat 28:10 for further discussion. ὑπάγετε ἀπαγγεἰλατε τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου ἵνα αʼπελθωσιν εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν. go tell my brothers that they should go to Galilee. [or go tell my bothers to go to Galilee]. Robertson, in his big grammar book, p. 991 says that in these examples, ἵνα + subjunctive verb (or sometimes future indicative verb) functions like "object or subject clauses like ὅτι clauses". After the verbs of saying, the ἵνα clause defines the content of the saying, although the content is not indicative. The ἵνα clause in this context is often interchangeable with the infinitive clause. So, ἵνα introduces a subjective/jussive clause, which states a purpose or a non-indicative content depending on the context. This is clearly seen in the following examples, where the ἵνα clause is used as a nominative case. e.g. Jo 4:34. Ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θἐλͅμα τοῦ πέμψαντος με My food is to do the will of him who sent me. Lk 1:43 Καὶ πόθεν μοι τοῦτο ἵνα ἔλθῃ ἡ μητηρ τοῦ κυρίου μου πρός εʼμέ; who am I that the mother of my Lord should come to me? [ Although the mother of my Lord has come is a fact, the use of a subjunctive clause here seems to refer to the very idea or notion of the mother of my Lord's coming to me] (3)
No. As I said, "ινα" cannot be used for factual assertions, just as Matt 28:10 does not mean that Jesus is asserting where his brothers are going. ==> Home run!. My translation implies "factual assertions". So, I should have written: What the law says to those in the law, it speaks that every mouth be stopped and all the world be guilty before God. If acceptable, I would prefer my original translation: What the law says to those in the law speaks that every mouth be stopped and all the world be guilty before God. The use of λαλεω [speaks] seems significant If the explanation in Thayer's lexicon has some merits: "The primary meaning of λαλειν, to utter oneself, enables us easily to understand its very frequent use in the sacred writers to denote the utterances by which G o d indicates or gives proof of his mind and will, whether immediately or through the instrumentality of his messengers and heralds. (Perhaps this use may account in part for the fact that, though in classic Greek lalei/n is the term for light and familiar speech, and so assumes readily a disparaging notion: in Biblical Greek it is nearly ιf not quite free from any such suggestion. ]" (4)moon wrote: (2) If the " ὅσα" clause cannot be the subject of λαλει I can still translate as follows: Whatever the law says to those in the law, it [the law] asserts that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God.
If that's the case, you should stick to a proper translation. Whether an impossible interpretation "fits" the context does not make it possible. Of course one could always say that no interpretation is impossible, but then deciding with certainty on the meaning of any sentence would be impossible, and discussion too becomes meaningless.[/quote] ===== You are definitely right. But I felt very strongly that I needed to do some experiment here. If Paul says: we have already charged that all, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin, AS IT IS WRITTEN " X ", would expect that the content of X would indict both Jews and Greeks. But according to the usual translation, Paul writes that the indictment of the law applies only to those in the law, that is, the Jews. That puzzles me. Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 25th, 2014, 7:28 ammoon wrote: (3) I am not fluent enough in Greek to have an intuitive judgement about the akwardness of this this understanding.
No they are not equivalent at all.moon wrote: (1) There are many cases in NT where ινα clause are equivalent to οτι clause after verbs of saying:
The purposed result of saying something is that "these stones might come to be bread". The text does not mean that he was supposed to say "these stones are to be bread", even though saying that might indeed have the desired effect.Mt 4:1. εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι γένωνται.
This "ινα" clause describes the purpose of "τον υιον του ανθρωπου", and so the "ινα" is actually part of the contents of what "γεγραπται". To rephrase using "οτι" would not only require switching from subjunctive to indicative, it would also need additional words like "δει" to convey a similar content of necessity, though it would still be slightly different from using "ινα".Μκ 9:12. πῶς γέγραπται ἐπ̀ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἵνα πολλὰ παθῃ και ἐξουδενηθῇ;
The intended result is that "μετανοωσιν". Again, this connotation of purpose is part of the contents of what they "εκηρυξαν". If you compare these with Matt 12:16, 14:36, 28:10 it would become clearer that "ινα" and "οτι" are distinct.Μκ 6:12. Καὶ ἐξελθόντες ἐκήρυξαν ἵνα μετανοῶσιν.
No. As I said, "ινα" cannot be used for factual assertions, just as Matt 28:10 does not mean that Jesus is asserting where his brothers are going.moon wrote: (2) If the " ὅσα" clause cannot be the subject of λαλει I can still translate as follows: Whatever the law says to those in the law, it [the law] asserts that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God.
If that's the case, you should stick to a proper translation. Whether an impossible interpretation "fits" the context does not make it possible. Of course one could always say that no interpretation is impossible, but then deciding with certainty on the meaning of any sentence would be impossible, and discussion too becomes meaningless. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 24th, 2014, 3:51 ammoon wrote: (3) I am not fluent enough in Greek to have an intuitive judgement about the akwardness of this this understanding.
OK, this is a little better, but "asserts that ... is" is not what I would expect from λαλεῖ ἵνα + subjunctive. The sense would have to more contingent (perhaps, "every mouth should be stopped" or something like that) than a normal indicative assertion, and that contingency would seem to weaken Paul's point, as outlined here. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 24th, 2014, 3:33 ammoon wrote: (2) If the " ὅσα" clause cannot be the subject of λαλει I can still translate as follows: Whatever the law says to those in the law, it [the law] asserts that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God.
David and Stephen, let me pursue my translation a little bit. (1) There are many cases in NT where ινα clause are equivalent to οτι clause after verbs of saying: Mt 4:1. εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι γένωνται. Μκ 9:12. πῶς γέγραπται ἐπ̀ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἵνα πολλὰ παθῃ και ἐξουδενηθῇ; Μκ 6:12. Καὶ ἐξελθόντες ἐκήρυξαν ἵνα μετανοῶσιν. they went out and preached that men should repent. (2) If the " ὅσα" clause cannot be the subject of λαλει I can still translate as follows: Whatever the law says to those in the law, it [the law] asserts that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God. (3) I am not fluent enough in Greek to have an intuitive judgement about the akwardness of this this understanding. But it fits naturally to Rom 3:9-10: προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ Ἰουδαίαν τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφʼ ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι, καθὼς γεʼγραπται ὅτι ....... Rom 3:9-10 reads naturally when what is quoted is applied to both the Jews and the Greek. Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 24th, 2014, 2:27 amStephen Carlson wrote:Uh, thanks. That was so impossible that I misread the proposal.David Lim wrote:Actually this isn't what Moon meant. He wanted the "οσα" to be the subject of "λαλει", as can be seen from his posts, which is simply impossible in my opinion.
Uh, thanks. That was so impossible that I misread the proposal. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 23rd, 2014, 11:27 amDavid Lim wrote: Actually this isn't what Moon meant. He wanted the "οσα" to be the subject of "λαλει", as can be seen from his posts, which is simply impossible in my opinion.
Actually this isn't what Moon meant. He wanted the "οσα" to be the subject of "λαλει", as can be seen from his posts, which is simply impossible in my opinion.Stephen Carlson wrote: On the second parsing, I'm not sure it is justified to infer that the lack of an explicit indirect objects means that it speaks to everyone or anyone. It could just well pick up the explicit indirect object of the relative clause, and it would have thus the effect of clarifying the manner of saying as "speaking," as if: "whatever the law tells them, it speaks (i.e., it does it by speaking). Yet there is hardly any daylight between this interpretation and the first parising.
As I've said earlier, it's impossible firstly because no one refers to words that are said as themselves speaking, and secondly because "ινα" heads a purpose clause, not contents of something spoken, so it gives the purposed result of "λαλει", not the contents. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 23rd, 2014, 11:01 ammoon wrote: What the law says to those in the law proclaims that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God. Here the ἵνα clause is considered to be the content of the law's speaking.
Interesting, but you'd need to then account for the subjunctive in the ἵνα clause. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 23rd, 2014, 8:00 ammoon wrote: Here the ἵνα clause is considered to be the content of the law's speaking.
[ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ] [ λαλεῖ] ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· How about this: What the law says to those in the law proclaims that every mouth is stopped and all the world is guilty before God. Here the ἵνα clause is considered to be the content of the law's speaking. Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 23rd, 2014, 7:15 am
On the second parsing, I'm not sure it is justified to infer that the lack of an explicit indirect objects means that it speaks to everyone or anyone. It could just well pick up the explicit indirect object of the relative clause, and it would have thus the effect of clarifying the manner of saying as "speaking," as if: "whatever the law tells them, it speaks (i.e., it does it by speaking). Yet there is hardly any daylight between this interpretation and the first parising. If the intent, however, to broaden the addressees of the laws speaking, I don't see why Paul would do so by varying the verb, instead of using πᾶσιν or something similar. The means that Paul did choose in the text at hand does not seem conducive to the end being proposed here. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 23rd, 2014, 4:35 am
"Somewhat" is really an understatement. It's like asking whether the following is valid English: "Whatever the second text says to us speaks so that we might be puzzled."moon wrote: I would like to know whether the second one is posssible as much as the first one, gramatically speaking, or is somewhat forced.
Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 23rd, 2014, 3:51 am
David, many thanks for your insights and patience. I accept your verdict in this issue. Thanks. Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — July 2nd, 2014, 3:19 am
Which is why I said, please stop continuing to hypothesize about Greek without much acquaintance with it.moon wrote: Woops! I am mistaken here. I should have know that "ινα τι" is a fixed expression for "why".
If you're going to ask everyone you can find until someone declares your hypothesis possible, then let me tell you in advance that you do not need to ask anyone, because there will always be someone who would agree with just about anything.moon wrote: I hope that the following rendering may be declared to be possible
moon wrote: Let me answer the four questions you raised by using the remaining examples. a) What is the case of "οσα" (b) What is the subject of "λαλει" (c) Give an example where "ινα" heads a clause that is unambiguously the content of speech. (d) Give an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object.
Wrong; the case of "οσος" usually has nothing to do with the antecedent, so everything else you said is irrelevant.moon wrote: (1) The case of ὁσα: The accusative of the relative pronoun ὁσος. Because the antecedent is missing, the ὁσα clause can be in any case. In my rendering, it is taken to be accusative, in particular, accusative of reference.
Okay, and to make clear, this is not what you originally hypothesized.moon wrote: (2) The subject of λαλει: The null pronoun, it. It refers to ὁ νομος.
These sentences do not have the same meaning unless you heap your interpretive opinions on top of both of them. The second is not an unambiguous example, so you did not answer my question.moon wrote: (3) examples where "ινα" heads a clause that is unambiguously the content of speech: Let me repeat the examples I already provided. (a) εκηρυσσεν τον Ιησοῦν ὁτι οὗτος εστιν ὁ υἱοσς τοῦ θεοῦ. He was proclaiming that Jesus is the son of God. Και εξελθοντες εκηρυξαν ἱνα ὁτιμετανοῶσιν. Going out, they preached that people should repent. The two sentences are isomorphic except for the modality the compliment clause ( indicative versus non-indicative). The clause specifies the content of speech (εκηρυσσεν, εκηρυξαν)
This too can be readily taken as a purpose clause, so it does not support your hypothesis. Furthermore, the original Hebrew text says "and he will release ...", which means that that phrase is indeed the purposed result of Moses speaking to Pharaoh, which in fact supports my hypothesis rather than yours.moon wrote: (b) LXX Exo 6:11. εισελθε λαλησον Φαρθω βασιλεῖ Αιγυπτου ̔ινα εξαποστειλῃ τους υἱους Ισραελ εκ τῆς αυτοῦ. KJV: Go in, speak unto Pharaho king of Egypt, that he let the children of Israel go out of his land. Here ̔the ινα clause specifies the content of speech ( λαλησον ).
No, for the above reason. And I could not find any unambiguous examples of (3) or (4) in the entire LXX+NT, which firstly implies that your hypothesis is very implausible, and secondly is easily explained by what I said about "ινα", because if it indicates a purposed result, it can only be used as a complement of verbs that can indicate a command. "λαλειν" simply isn't one of these verbs. Also, "ινα + <subjunctive>" has almost the same meaning as an infinitive (which is also used for denoting result), but the infinitive cannot be used in some cases because it is unable to specify the person. As for the grammatically possible but in my opinion unlikely "as many things as the law says to the ones in the law, [the law] speaks [those things], so that ...", I shall not comment because it is essentially a matter of interpretation. But I will say that if no good translation renders it the way you think, you had better know what you're doing. Anyway I have enough of this for now, so please find someone else to continue this discussion if you insist on your strange way of understanding "ινα". Sorry! Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 30th, 2014, 10:14 pmmoon wrote: (4) an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object: The example (b) above is an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object.
David wrote: Furthermore, if you know a bit of Greek you'll realize that "ινα τι ..." means "for what ..." / "why ..." and "ινα" does not "introduce a direct question" meaning anything like what you said. So I suggest you refrain from continuing your hypothesizing. == Woops! I am mistaken here. I should have know that "ινα τι" is a fixed expression for "why". Let me answer the four questions you raised by using the remaining examples. a) What is the case of "οσα" (b) What is the subject of "λαλει" (c) Give an example where "ινα" heads a clause that is unambiguously the content of speech. (d) Give an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object. I hope that the following rendering may be declared to be possible
:
" With reference to what the law says to those in the law, it speaks that every mouth
might be stopped and all the world might be guilty before God."
(1) The case of ὁσα: The accusative of the relative pronoun ὁσος.
Because the antecedent is missing, the ὁσα clause can be in any case.
In my rendering, it is taken to be accusative, in particular, accusative of reference.
(2) The subject of λαλει: The null pronoun, it. It refers to ὁ νομος.
(3) examples where "ινα" heads a clause that is unambiguously the content of speech:
Let me repeat the examples I already provided.
(a)
εκηρυσσεν τον Ιησοῦν ὁτι οὗτος εστιν ὁ υἱοσς τοῦ θεοῦ.
He was proclaiming that Jesus is the son of God.
Και εξελθοντες εκηρυξαν ἱνα ὁτιμετανοῶσιν.
Going out, they preached that people should repent.
The two sentences are isomorphic except for the modality the compliment clause (
indicative versus non-indicative). The clause specifies the content of speech (εκηρυσσεν, εκηρυξαν)
(b)
LXX Exo 6:11.
εισελθε λαλησον Φαρθω βασιλεῖ Αιγυπτου ̔ινα εξαποστειλῃ τους υἱους Ισραελ εκ τῆς αυτοῦ.
KJV: Go in, speak unto Pharaho king of Egypt, that he let the children of Israel go out of his land.
Here ̔the ινα clause specifies the content of speech ( λαλησον ).
(4) an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object:
The example (b) above is an example where "λαλει" has a content clause as its direct object.
==>
(5) Justification for taking the ὁσα clause as the accusative of reference:
For this decision, I was guided by Rom 10:5:
Μωυσῆ γαρ γραφει την δικαιοσυνην την εκ τοῦ νομου ὁτι ὁ ποιησας αυτα ανθρωποσ ζησεται εν αυτοις.
Moses writes with reference to the righteousness from the law that the person who does them shall live in them.
I think the sentence still makes sense if we replace γραφει by λαλει:
Μωυσῆ γαρ λαλει την δικαιοσυνην την εκ τοῦ νομου ὁτι ὁ ποιησας αυτα ανθρωποσ ζησεται εν αυτοις.
Here the ὁτι clause specifies what την δικαιοσυνην την εκ τοῦ is.
Similarly, in Rom 3:19, the ἱνα clause specifies what ὁσα ὁ νομος λεγει τοῖς εν τῷ νομῳ ισ is.
(6) The problem with this approach is that the above examples where the ἱνα clause specifies the content of speech
are those where the content appeasr in the context of "command". εκηρυσσεν, εκηρυξαν,
λαλησον in the examples have an implication of command.
In the case of Rom 3:19, however, the content appears in the context of "declaration". The λαλει declares a verdict here.
I haven't found other examples for that. For now, I just assume that both types of contents are modal contents
and can be specified by ἱνα clauses.
(7) The following rendering, which David considers grammatically possible, would be fine for my purpose:
What the law says to those in the law, it (= the law) speaks [it] so that every mouth
might be stopped and all the world might be guilty before God.
We can view the sentence in two ways.
(a)
We can take "what the law says to those in the law" as the direct object of "speaks".
(b)
Or, we can take "what the law says to those in the law" as a casus pendens, a nominal clause
which is used as the object of the verb "speaks". But the situation is ambiguous, because
this nominal clause is not resumed by an object pronoun. But if we posit the null object pronoun
which is allowed in Greek [as well as the subject null pronoun], the sentence can be considered
to use a casus pendens.
In terms of the rhythm of a sentence, I like (b) better than (a).
"What the law says to those in the law, it speaks it so that every mouth
might be stopped and all the world might be guilty before God.
I think for now, I would be satisfied with (a) or (b) above.
Moon Jung
Statistics: Posted by moon — June 30th, 2014, 12:10 pm
Moon, please answer my four questions first, and you will see why your current hypothesis about Rom 3:19 is quite impossible (though less impossible than your first one). Furthermore, if you know a bit of Greek you'll realize that "ινα τι ..." means "for what ..." / "why ..." and "ινα" does not "introduce a direct question" meaning anything like what you said. So I suggest you refrain from continuing your hypothesizing. Statistics: Posted by David Lim — June 29th, 2014, 9:24 am
Carl and Stephen: thanks for the comments. Stephen got the intent of my question right. Which way of parsing should I choose: (1) [ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει ] [ τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ] ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· (2) [ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ] [ λαλεῖ] ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· The second one has the implication that what the law says to those in the law actually speaks to ALL people, not just to those in the law. I would like to know whether the second one is posssible as much as the first one, gramatically speaking, or is somewhat forced. Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 22nd, 2014, 11:03 pm
I think he's asking whether the dative τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ belongs with λέγει or λαλεῖ, but the second parsing is so confusing that I am not sure. Statistics: Posted by Stephen Carlson — June 19th, 2014, 7:24 am
I think you're confusing "parsing" with a "translation" that is so wooden that it doesn't even conform to the standard grammatical usage of English. Moreover, you're asking about the end-result of a way of construing the text without going through the intermediate process of analysis that must explain and justify that end-result. Let's start over with the text: Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ, ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι: This is the introductory part: "We know that ... " What follows is the construction about which you are asking. The construction about which you are really asking is this: ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ Here ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει functions as the object of τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ. "λαλεῖ" is the main verb of the sentence; its subject is ὁ νόμος, which is implicit from the introductory clause. So the main clause is: (ὁ νόμος) λάλει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ and the object of λαλεῖ is ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει. If we offer a woodenly literal English version of that, we get: (The Law says to those in the Law what/all the things that/however many things that the Law says, ... I don't think you're asking about the last clause, but I'll discuss it to complete the accounting: you should note the subjunctive verbs φραγῇ and γένηται which are required by the introductory adverbial conjunction ἵνα: this is a purpose clause, explaining the purpose for which the Law says what it says: namely, so that "the whole world" (all humanity" should be subject to God. Does that help? Statistics: Posted by cwconrad — June 19th, 2014, 6:56 ammoon wrote: We have in Rom 3:19: Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ, ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· It is usually parsed as: We know that what the law says, says to those in the law, so that every mouth is stopped and all the world is under judgement before God. But I found out that some people take it as follows: What the law says to those in the law, says, so that every mouth is stopped and all the world is under judgement before God. Is there any reason for the majority translation? Is the other translation somewhat forced?
We have in Rom 3:19: Οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ, ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ· It is usually parsed as: We know that what the law says, says to those in the law, so that every mouth is stopped and all the world is under judgement before God. But I found out that some people take it as follows: What the law says to those in the law, says, so that every mouth is stopped and all the world is under judgement before God. Is there any reason for the majority translation? Is the other translation somewhat forced? Moon Jung Statistics: Posted by moon — June 19th, 2014, 6:14 am